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I. RULES OF CONDUCT AND PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATION: THE
DISTINCTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
You are awakened by an unfamiliar sound from the basement
garage of your rowhouse. As you sit up in bed the handgun in your
hall closet comes to mind; then you remember Earl Miller, a neigh-
bor down the row who shot and killed a night burglar in his garage
last year. The prosecutor said Earl had no right to kill the burglar.
Earl's attorney claimed that Earl had the right and that even if
Earl didn't-although he was sure Earl did-Earl honestly and
reasonably believed he had the right. Earl was tried and acquitted.
You aren't sure what that means for you. Can you or can't you
lawfully shoot a burglar in your basement garage?
You grab your gun from the hall closet and head down to the
first floor. The light switch is at the head of the basement stairs.
You open the door quietly, flip the switch, and draw back into the
dark hall. Something drops to the basement floor, followed by the
sound of steps, the shattering of glass, a muffled scream, and si-
lence. On descending the stairs, you find your back window broken
and the intruder motionless, blood pouring from a cut in his neck.
You believe you could stop the bleeding by applying pressure
but you don't really want to help the man: after all, he had been
stealing from you. And on top of that, the gushing blood and mess
make you wince. Should you help him? Must you? You aren't sure.
You remember the newspaper story about the motorist who
stood and watched another motorist bleed to death after their cars
collided. The prosecutor claimed that the motorist could have and
should have stopped the bleeding, but he stood and watched...
which is exactly what you are doing now. The motorist's attorney
claimed that he had no legal duty to act and, in any case, was
dazed from the accident. The man was tried and acquitted. What
does that mean for you? If you can, must you help the intruder?
Will you be a criminal if you just stand and do nothing? You wish
you weren't thinking so clearly. Perhaps it would have been better
to have fallen down the stairs and been dazed. Not a good time to
be making jokes, you conclude.
The rules of lawful conduct frequently are unclear even to ac-
tors who are intelligent, thoughtful, and informed. Can you law-
fully shoot the intruding burglar? Does the law require that you
aid the helpless burglar? In the situation described above, the ac-
tor knows the disposition of a recently litigated case closely analo-
gous to each dilemma confronted, and seeks to use that outcome to
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guide his own conduct; yet he is still unable to discern the applica-
ble legal rules.
Such uncertainty is not uncommon in our current system. Fre-
quently, neither existing statements of the law nor our process of
public adjudication effectively communicate the rules that define
lawful conduct. My thesis in this article is that current criminal
law doctrine does a poor job at one of its most important func-
tions: telling people what they can, must, and must not do, under
threat of criminal sanction.
Our condemnation and punishment of criminals, as distin-
guished from civil violators, rests upon an assumption that a crimi-
nal violation entails some consciousness of wrongdoing or at least a
gross deviation from a clearly defined standard of conduct. But
how can such an assumption be sustained if the demands of the
law are unclear? How can we condemn and punish violations of the
rules of lawful conduct if the rules are not and cannot reasonably
be known by the general public? One also may wonder how effec-
tive the criminal law can be in deterring criminal conduct if the
law's demands are unclear.
In this article I will show why our legal system's rules of con-
duct are presently unclear, how the system arrived at its current
state, and what can be done to make the rules of conduct clearer.
My arguments and conclusions are, in brief, as follows: The crimi-
nal law fails to communicate clear rules of conduct because it fails
to distinguish this communicative function from that of adjudicat-
ing violations of the rules, which requires primarily an assessment
of the blameworthiness of the violator. These two func-
tions-announcing public rules of conduct and assessing individual
blame in adjudication of a violation-have very different doctrinal
foundations.1 The rules of conduct function gives the general pop-
ulation ex ante direction as to what they can, must, and must not
do. The principles of adjudication function gives decisionmakers
(i.e., prosecutors, juries, and judges) guidance in assessing ex post
the blameworthiness of an individual's violation of the rules. Sec-
tion II of this article illustrates the rules of conduct/principles of
adjudication distinction by identifying how different aspects of
current law effectively serve these functions.
1 The distinction is an application of one found in legal philosophy between rules to
guide the general public's behavior and rules for decisionmakers. The distinction was recog-
nized in Talmudic law, used by Bentham, and recently reexamined by Dan-Cohen. See Meir
Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law,
97 Harv L Rev 625, 626 n 1 (1984).
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The failure to distinguish between these two functions in for-
mulating the criminal law creates two kinds of difficulties. First,
the doctrines may be ineffectively formulated and codified for their
primary function. For example, rules of conduct need to communi-
cate a legal standard that can be understood, remembered, and ap-
plied by the general public. Can one lawfully shoot a basement
burglar? Must one help him when he is bleeding and helpless? Un-
fortunately, rules of conduct are frequently drafted in a form that
is more appropriate for a principle of adjudication, entailing broad
and open-ended inquiries into a variety of factors that determine
blameworthiness. Many people consequently cannot discern the
answers to these questions from the applicable rule of conduct.
And many people who think they know the answers will be wrong.
Conversely, principles of adjudication frequently are drafted in a
form that may be appropriate for a rule of conduct but that does
not accommodate the complex and multi-faceted analyses that de-
termine an actor's blameworthiness for violating a rule of conduct.
To be effective, the rules of conduct must be simple, based on
objective criteria with easily communicable and comprehensible
standards. The doctrines embodying the principles of adjudication,
on the other hand, must take account of the complex and varied
situational factors relevant to an actor's blameworthiness, as well
as the capacities and characteristics of the particular actor. The
principles also must incorporate or at least mirror the community's
expectations of the actor. In other words, they must use subjective
criteria and rely upon more individualized, judgmental, and nor-
mative standards. Section III of this article describes and discusses
errors made in the formulation and drafting of legal rules, and sug-
gests some general drafting strategies.
A second difficulty arising from the criminal law's failure to
distinguish between rules of conduct and principles of adjudication
is the ambiguity resulting from acquittals and dismissals, and this
ambiguity's detrimental effect on the rules of conduct function.
Does the acquittal of the neighbor who shot the burglar mean that
shooting burglars is lawful, in the sense that it is permitted by the
rules of conduct? Or, rather, does the acquittal mean that such
killing is not permitted but that the neighbor's mistake on the is-
sue was, under the circumstances, not blameworthy? Similarly,
does the acquittal of the motorist who let the accident victim bleed
to death mean that there is no legal duty to help; or does it instead
mean that, despite his legal duty to help, the motorist, given his
particular (perhaps dazed) condition and his particular (perhaps
decreased) abilities, could not fairly be blamed for his inaction?
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Instead of restating, reinforcing, and refining society's rules of
conduct, acquittals at public trials (as well as dismissals by courts
and publicly-reported decisions not to prosecute) frequently serve
only to create ambiguity and confusion regarding those rules. Does
the failure to condemn and punish follow from the propriety of the
actor's conduct, or from the actor's blamelessness for admittedly
improper conduct? Only a system that distinguishes a no-viola-
tion-of-the-rules-of-conduct acquittal from a blameless-violation
acquittal can avoid this ambiguity and resurrect the educational
value of our public adjudication system. Section IV sets out a num-
ber of proposed procedural reforms designed to implement this
and other changes in the criminal law.
II. RULES OF CONDUCT AND PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATION IN
CURRENT DOCTRINE
A. The Distinction Applied to Current Doctrine
What aspects of current criminal law state society's rules of
lawful conduct? That is, which of the existing criminal law rules
must citizens know in order to keep their conduct lawful? The sur-
prise, for me, in the relatively comprehensive review that follows is
the large proportion of criminal law that is not part of the rules of
conduct, but that serves some other function, most notably the ex
post function of assessing a violator's blameworthiness.
1. Objective elements of an offense.
In a typical criminal code, the bulk of the rules of conduct are
found in the offense definitions, which are usually set out in a Spe-
cial Part. The objective elements of an offense seem, at first, to do
no more than define the conduct prohibited by that offense (i.e.,
they describe the rule of conduct), while the mental elements seem
to determine whether the actor has satisfied the objective elements
under circumstances that we would consider blameworthy (i.e.,
they describe the relevant principle of adjudication). As shall be-
come apparent, however, such generalizations are inaccurate with
respect to both objective elements and mental elements.
The objective elements of offense definitions typically describe
prohibited conduct: one may not enter on another's land without
license, one may not offer a bribe to a juror, one may not cause
injury to another person, etc. The Model Penal Code's offense defi-
nitions are constructed from three classes of objective elements:
1990]
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conduct, circumstance, and result.2 An offense definition generally
prohibits conduct under certain circumstances (i.e., without li-
cense) or conduct that causes a specified result (i.e., injury to an-
other person).
But the common, "objective" nature of objective elements
hides an important distinction: not all objective elements of of-
fense definitions are part of the rules of conduct. Results are objec-
tive, like conduct and circumstances, and are quite unlike the sub-
jective mental elements of purpose, knowledge, and recklessness.
But result elements are different from other objective elements in
that they do not describe the conduct that an actor is prohibited
from engaging in. The rules of conduct address themselves to an
actor's conduct, not its result, for it is only the actor's conduct that
the rules can influence. The rules may purport to prohibit a partic-
ular result but in fact all they can do is direct actors not to engage
in particular conduct that is certain to bring about-or risks bring-
ing about-that result. A real resulting harm may properly make
the violation more serious, but the fortuity of whether the result
actually occurs does not alter the existence of a violation; the na-
ture of the conduct that constituted the violation remains un-
changed. Thus, result elements of offense definitions properly be-
long in the principles of adjudication.
2. Secondary prohibitions.
The conduct and circumstances elements of specific offense
definitions define the primary prohibitions of the criminal law.
But the criminal law prohibits not only conduct that violates a pri-
mary prohibition, but also conduct toward that end. These second-
ary prohibitions proscribe assisting, attempting, soliciting, and
conspiring to commit prohibited conduct. The secondary prohibi-
tions thus enlarge the primary prohibitions: just as one may not
violate a primary prohibition, neither may one assist or attempt or
solicit or conspire to commit such violation.
Secondary prohibitions typically are of two sorts: (1) doctrines
expanding the primary prohibition by imputing to the actor the
I See Model Penal Code § 1.13(q) (ALI, 1962) ("MPC"). See generally Paul H. Robin-
son and Jane A. Grail, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal
Code and Beyond, 35 Stan L Rev 681 (1983). The Code does not define the terms "con-
duct," "circumstance," and "result," but I have suggested definitioni elsewhere. Id at 719-
25.
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conduct of another, as in complicity,3 and (2) doctrines expanding
the primary prohibition by prohibiting conduct short of the sub-
stantive harm or evil, as in the inchoate offenses of attempt, con-
spiracy, solicitation, and possession. Secondary prohibitions some-
times are contained in general code provisions that incorporate by
reference the offense definition containing the primary prohibition,
as with general inchoate offenses and complicity provisions.4 Sec-
ondary prohibitions also sometimes are contained in specific of-
fenses, such as special codified attempt provisions (i.e., assault
with intent to rape, burglary, and possession of burglar's tools).
The function of the elements of the first kind of secondary
prohibition-which imputes to the actor another's conduct, as in
complicity-reflects a pattern similar to offense definitions. The
conduct and circumstance elements of the doctrine constitute the
rule of conduct, while the mental elements required by the doc-
trine serve the function of the adjudicatory principles of blame. An
actor charged with complicity in theft, for example, may lack the
culpability required for liability; his negligence will be insufficient
for liability if the offense requires purpose, knowledge, or reckless-
ness as to ownership by another. Yet all persons are warned that
the rules of conduct forbid assisting another to take a third per-
son's property, even though this actor is not to be punished for his
violation.5
The same analysis applies to other doctrines that impute con-
duct, such as liability for causing crime by an innocent, the Pink-
erton doctrine, and the complicity aspect of the felony-murder
3 For a discussion of the imputation of conduct and other objective elements, see Paul
H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 Yale L J 609, 613-15, 617-18 (1984). Doctrines
of omission liability, which might be viewed as imputing required conduct, are discussed in
text at notes 16-20.
4 See, for example, MPC §§ 2.06, 5.01-5.03.
1 One could argue that, as with attempt (see text at notes 10-14), some of the mental
elements of the complicity doctrine are required to define the prohibition. That is, as with
attempt, conduct that normally is lawful can be a violation of the rules of conduct if done
with the intention to assist an offense. Thus, the intention to assist another to commit an
offense is necessary in some instances to the criminalization of conduct. But the prohibition
against assisting or encouraging has objective meaning independent of the intention. An
omniscient observer viewing the objective circumstances can determine whether an actor is
in fact assisting a violation, and the rules of conduct should announce that such assistance is
prohibited. No similar observation and conclusion is possible in the case of attempts, even
for an omniscient observer aware of all observable facts. There, the observer frequently
must know the actor's intention to know whether his conduct is an attempt to violate a rule
of conduct.
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rule.' Under a doctrine of imputation, an actor is held liable al-
though he does not satisfy the elements of the offense definition.
The conduct and circumstance elements of these doctrines typi-
cally define the ways in which the rules of conduct prohibition has
been expanded to cover the actor's conduct. The mental elements
function to assess the actor's culpability for the violation.
The second kind of secondary prohibition-inchoate con-
duct-reflects a different pattern, which is discussed below. Let me
lay a foundation for this by examining more carefully the function
of mental elements.
3. State of mind elements.
Typically, an offense's objective conduct and circumstance ele-
ments are adequate to describe the prohibition: entering another's
land without license, having intercourse with a girl under ten, en-
gaging in conduct that will cause or risks causing the death of an-
other human being, etc.1 The state of mind" requirements of an
offense-i.e., knowledge of lack of license, negligence as to the girl
being under ten, or awareness that one's conduct will cause or risk
another's death-are not necessary to describe the conduct that is
prohibited.9 Even if the actor escapes liability because he does not
satisfy the state of mind requirements-i.e., he did not know his
entry was unlicensed, he was non-negligent as to the girl being
under ten, or he was unaware that his conduct would cause or risk
another's death-the actor's conduct nonetheless should be
avoided by all persons in the future. In other words, despite the
actor's acquittal for lack of culpability, his behavior did violate the
rules of conduct.
6 For illustrations and authorities for each of these doctrines and for other doctrines
imputing an objective element, see Robinson, 93 Yale L J at 614-15, 617-18 (cited in note 3).
7 Of course, proof of some objective elements may hinge upon proof of another person's
mental state, such as; absence of a victim's consent, see, for example, 11 Del Code Ann
§§ 767, 770(1), 771(1), 772(1)&(3), 773(1), 774(1)&(2), 775(1)&(2) (1974) (all including ab-
sence of "consent" as an element of sex offenses); the victim's fear, see, for example, Tex
Penal Code Ann § 29.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974) (defining robbery as placing another in "fear"
of bodily injury or death during the course of a theft); or the victim's false impression, see,
for example, 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3922(a)(1) (Purdon 1983) (defining theft by deception
to require creation or reinforcement of a "false impression").
8 I include negligence within the term "state of mind" even though it is really the cul-
pable absence of a state of mind: that is, culpable unawareness of a risk. I refer here to the
mental risk-taking form of negligence and recklessness, not the real world risk-creation
form. See text at notes 38-44.
9 Some writers disagree. "[U]nder our present law . . . mens rea is crucial to the
description of the behaviour we want to prevent." Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Inno-
cence, 26 Camb L J 273, 286 (1968).
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As with our analysis of objective elements, we initially may be
attracted to a generalization that all mental elements are part of
the principles for adjudicating blame. But like objective elements,
the state of mind requirements of current doctrine include both
rules of conduct and principles of adjudication. As an example of a
state of mind requirement that is necessary to define the conduct
prohibited, consider the general attempt offense. The conduct and
circumstance elements of the offense provide some statement of
the rules of conduct prohibition, but standing alone these objective
elements do not fully define the prohibited conduct. The require-
ment of conduct that constitutes a "substantial step" toward com-
mission of an offense, common in modern attempt definitions, is
inadequate in itself to define the prohibited conduct.'0 Some con-
duct may constitute a substantial step as a purely objective matter,
but in fact be entirely innocent and acceptable conduct that is not
prohibited. Such conduct violates the rules of conduct only when
accompanied by an intention to violate the substantive rules."
Lighting one's pipe is not a violation of the rules of conduct, unless
it is a step in a plan to ignite a neighbor's haystack. Giving a young
girl a ride is not a violation of the rules of conduct, unless it is
done with the intention of sexually assaulting her. Thus, to de-
scribe the minimum requirements of prohibited conduct, the rules
of conduct for attempts must include a state of mind require-
ment-the intention to engage in conduct that would constitute a
rule violation. 12
10 The prohibition against attempting to violate a rule of conduct includes, in modern
statutes, even those instances where the only possibility of a successful violation is in the
actor's mind. It seems likely that most people would deem such "impossible attempts" un-
acceptable conduct. See, for example, Ira P. Robbins, Attempting the Impossible: The
Emerging Consensus, 23 Harv J Leg 377, 419-22 (1986); Paul H. Robinson, 1 Criminal Law
Defenses § 85 (West, 1984). Existing doctrine prohibits and punishes such imagined viola-
tions. See, for example, MPC § 5.01(1)(a) comment 3 (punishing impossible attempts by
providing that the defendant's conduct be judged under the "circumstances... as he be-
lieves them to be"); id, comment 3(b)-(c) (describing policy considerations and the Model
Penal Code's position). This form of attempt liability relies most heavily on an actor's sub-
jettive state of mind; even the risk of a successful violation of the rules of conduct's substan-
tive prohibitions exists only in the actor's mind.
22 Thus MPC § 5.01(1)(c) only prohibits a "substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in [the] commission of the crime" (emphasis added).
2 A similar intention requirement exists in codified attempt offenses such as assault
with intent to rape or burglary (which requires an intention to commit a felony within).
There is some confusion over the meaning of the intent requirement in attempts, as embod-
ied in the common law view that "attempt is a specific intent offense." I argue that the
necessary intent should be merely the actor's intention to engage in the conduct constituting
the substantive offense. See Paul H. Robinson, Fundamentals of Criminal Law: Teacher's
Manual 72-73 (Little, Brown, 1988). Others argue that the actor must intend all elements of
1990]
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The same analysis might be made for conspiracy and solicita-
tion; under this approach, conduct would violate the prohibition
against conspiracy or solicitation only if accompanied by an inten-
tion to conspire with or solicit another to commit a substantive
violation of the rules of conduct. On the other hand, conspiracy
and solicitation might be distinguishable from attempt. One could
argue that the rules of conduct ought to prohibit agreeing with or
soliciting another to violate the rules of conduct, even if the actor
does not intend that he or the other person violate the rules. Any
agreement or apparent agreement to commit an offense and any
solicitation of another to commit an offense might be seen as
harmful conduct. The harmfulness of the conduct does not always
depend upon the actor's subjective state of mind. Therefore, the
rules of conduct might appropriately prohibit all agreements and
solicitations to commit an offense, no matter whether intentional
or inadvertent. That is, the rules might require one to avoid con-
duct that even accidentally gives the appearance of such an agree-
ment or solicitation. Recall Henry II's rhetorical question, "Who
will free me from this turbulent priest?" which was mistaken as a
directive to kill Thomas Becket.13 One's lack of intent may suggest
a lack of blameworthiness, but society may nonetheless seek to dis-
courage even inadvertent agreements and solicitations.14 There is
no analogously harmful "unintended attempt."
the offense, including circumstance and result elements. See, for example, People v Trinkle,
68 Ill 2d 198, 369 NE2d 888, 890-91 (1977).
13 For a modern analogy, see Ben A. Franklin, Teamster Defendant Accused of Role in
a Murder, NY Times A28 (Feb 10, 1983).
14 Many statutes' reliance upon subjective criteria such as mental elements in defining
the prohibition against attempt limits their effectiveness in describing and communicating
the prohibited conduct. See the discussion of superiority of objective criteria for formulating
the rules of conduct in Section III of this article. This may explain in part why attempt
liability, especially liability for impossible attempts, generates such controversy, and why
some common law formulations of attempt (for example, the res ipsa loquitur test) require
that the actor's intention to commit the offense be manifested in his conduct, thus making
the criteria more like the objective criteria found in other parts of the rules of conduct. The
objective elements of these attempt formulations might themselves be sufficient to describe
the conduct constituting an attempt, and thus might provide a rule of conduct that does not
require reference to the actor's state of mind. The difficulties with the subjective aspect of
the rules of conduct also may explain why some modern attempt formulations and proposals
would require more objective evidence of the actor's intention to commit an offense. Model
Penal Code § 5.01(2)'s evidentiary requirement that the "substantial step" conduct be
"strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose" resembles some of the common law
formulations. The same concerns may explain the host of offenses that essentially codify,
and thereby objectify, attempt liability, such as offenses that criminalize the possession of
instruments of crime or the possession of drugs. On the other hand, one might argue that
there is little reason to insist that the rules of conduct tell an actor who intends to violate
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4. Culpability mental states vs. criminalization mental states.
The above analysis of attempt offenses suggests that there are
two distinct categories of mental elements: culpability mental ele-
ments, which function as part of the principles of adjudication, and
criminalization mental elements, which are a necessary component
of the rules of conduct. Criminalization mental elements typically
appear in secondary prohibitions and require an intention to vio-
late a primary prohibition, such as the requirement in attempt
that the actor intend to engage in conduct that constitutes a sub-
stantive offense.
An offense containing criminalization mental elements will
often contain culpability mental elements as well. In attempted as-
sault, for example, the intention to engage in the conduct consti-
tuting the assault is a criminalization mental element; as noted
above, it is necessary to a description of the prohibited conduct.
The requirement in the same offense that the actor manifest at
least recklessness as to the victim being a person 15 is a culpability
mental element. That is, the rule of conduct is complete even with-
out this requirement; actors are warned not to attempt to assault
persons even though this actor will not be punished for his assault
because he was faultless or only negligent as to the victim being a
person (e.g., he attempted to abort what he believed to be an invia-
ble fetus, or he set a hunting trap for what he thought was a dog
stealing his chickens).
5. Omission rules and the voluntary act requirement.
Another area where current doctrine mixes rules of conduct
and principles of adjudication is that of omission liability. The
duty requirement in omission liability provisions serves as a rule of
conduct; the various legal duties to act describe what affirmative
actions the rules of conduct require actors to take. The capacity
the rules of conduct precisely when his conduct has reached the point of being criminal.
Vagueness in this aspect of the rules may be tolerable if not desirable.
15 Under MPC § 211.1, for example, the assault must be upon another human being.
Model Penal Code § 2.02(1) requires proof of culpability "with respect to each material
element of the offense."
14 Under present law, a duty to act arises in two ways. First, a special offense defined in
terms of an omission may create the duty and, in the same provision, punish the failure to
act. See, for example, Minn Stat Ann § 604.05 (West Cum Supp 1987) (persons at the scene
of an emergency must give reasonable assistance to a victim who has suffered grave physical
harm); and RI Gen Laws § 11-56-1 (Cum Supp 1987). Compare Wis Stat Ann § 940.34
(West Cum Supp 1987-88) (person who knows that a crime is being committed and that its
victim is exposed to bodily harm must provide or summon assistance; private detectives and
1990]
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requirement in omission provisions serves as a principle of adjudi-
cation; it bars liability for violation of a legal duty when the actor
cannot be blamed for her failure to perform. 17
Like the capacity requirement in omission offenses, the volun-
tary act requirement performs the principle of adjudication func-
tion in commission cases.' 8 While the voluntary act requirement is
sometimes thought of as a required objective element (actus reus)
of every offense,' 9 it does nothing to define the rules of conduct.
Rather, it exculpates an actor whose violation of the rules is
blameless because her conduct was involuntary.20
6. Justification defenses.
The various rules of conduct described so far contribute to
what may be called the doctrines of criminalization. They tell per-
security guards must report crime if there is a reasonable basis for a belief that a crime has
been committed). If no special offense for omission exists, an actor nonetheless may be crim-
inally liable under an offense that on its face prohibits conduct or conduct causing a prohib-
ited result, if the prohibited conduct or result occurs because of the actor's failure to per-
form a duty. See, for example, Commonwealth v Welansky, 316 Mass 383, 55 NE2d 902, 909
(1944) (bar owner violated duty to prevent and take measures to handle fires; the court
reasoned that while reckless conduct usually requires an affirmative act, where there is a
duty of care reckless conduct may consist of intentional failure to perform it). The principle
permitting substitution of a failure to perform a legal duty for the conduct requirement of
an offense has been incorporated into many modern criminal codes. See, for example, stat-
utes cited in Robinson, 1 Criminal Law Defenses § 86(a) at 440 n 2 (cited in note 10). A
general duty to aid exists for actors in particular relationships to the victim-for example,
where the actor has a family or contractual relationship with the person who is endangered.
See, for example, Jones v United States, 308 F2d 307, 310 (DC Cir 1962); Robinson, 1
Criminal Law Defenses § 86(c)(2) at 445-48 (describing the sources of a duty to act).
1 See, for example, MPC § 2.01(1); authorities cited in Robinson, 1 Criminal Law De-
fenses § 87 at 449 (cited in note 10). The general excuse defenses--such as duress, insanity,
and involuntary intoxication-also will be available to hold an actor blameless for his viola-
tion of the rules of conduct by omission to act.
"8 MPC § 2.01(2)(d) (an actor's conduct is involuntary if the conduct constituting the
violation "is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor"). While the rules of
conduct prohibit striking another person, doing so during a seizure in an elevator may not
violate our normative expectations for the epileptic. Of course, if the epileptic knew or
should have known of her condition and should have taken steps to prevent the blow, we
might feel differently about the violation. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Con-
ditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine,
71 Va L Rev 1, 30-36 (1985).
'" See, for example, Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law 605 (Foundation, 3d ed 1982).
1o It is not entirely clear whether the voluntariness requirement and the analogous ca-
pacity requirement for omissions create a presumption of blameworthiness on the part of
the actor who has satisfied them, and thus are doctrines of culpability, or whether the de-
fenses of involuntariness and incapacity rebut a presumption of culpability, and thus are
doctrines of excuse. See text following note 31. I tend toward the latter view because, like
the general excuses, involuntariness and incapacity are abnormalities, not attributes of an
ordinary person, such as the culpable mental states of purpose, knowledge, and recklessness.
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sons what they cannot (or must) do. A second part of the rules of
conduct tells persons when they may legally engage in conduct that
violates a doctrine of criminalization. The doctrines of justifica-
tion, as they may be called, tell persons that they may engage in
the described conduct even though such conduct would be a viola-
tion of the rules of conduct absent the justification.2 1 The rules of
conduct do not require an actor to do everything that is justified
(as, for example, in the omissions context), but the actor remains
within the rules of conduct if his violation is justified. The common
justifications, usually available as defenses, include the lesser evils
doctrine;2  the defensive force doctrines of self-defense, defense of
others, defense of property, and defense of habitation; and the
public authority doctrines of law enforcement authority, authority
to maintain order and safety, parental authority, benevolent custo-
dial authority, medical authority, authority to prevent a suicide,
judicial authority, military authority, and general public
authority.2
That the justification portion of the rules of conduct typically
is formulated as a series of defenses is appropriate. A violation of a
doctrine of criminalization may be said to create a presumption
that the rules of conduct have been violated. The doctrines of jus-
tification serve to rebut that presumption where appropriate by
recognizing that the circumstances of the violation make the con-
duct acceptable. Note that under this conceptualization, the doc-
trines of justification are not doctrines of "exculpation," as they
1 The phrase "doctrines of justification" refers primarily to the general justification
defenses. See, for example, MPC Art 3. But the phrase and the underlying concept also
include doctrines of similar effect that are found in a variety of other places. For example,
recklessness and negligence are defined to exclude "justified" risks. See MPC
§ 2.02(2)(c),(d). On the role of justification defenses in providing ex ante conduct rules, see
George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 Harv L Rev 949, 976 (1985).
2 As a general principle, conduct that violates a prohibition will be justified if it avoids
a greater harm than the prohibition itself. The lesser evils defense explicitly provides for
such a balancing. See, for example, MPC § 3.02(a). Other special rules that limit the amount
of force authorized according to the nature of the harm threatened reflect the same princi-
ple. See generally Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses §§ 121(a)(2)(B), 124(d),(g), 131(d),
141(e) at 5, 50-54, 60-68, 81-88, 118-20 (cited in note 10) (describing the statement of the
proportionality requirement in the lesser evils, defensive force, and public authority justifi-
cations). But see Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
Colum L Rev 1897, 1904 n 22 (1984) (arguing that this is "serious oversimplication" of the
nature of justifications).
23 For illustrations and authorities for each of these defenses and for a discussion of the
relations among them, see Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analy-
sis, 82 Colum L Rev 199, 213-16 (1982).
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are commonly described;24 they do not "clear from alleged fault or
guilt."25 Violation of a doctrine of criminalization does not create a
presumption of fault or guilt-such a presumption comes only af-
ter application of the adjudicatory principles of blame-so there is
no fault or guilt yet established from which the actor can be "ex-
culpated" by a doctrine of justification.
This completes my survey of current doctrines embodying the
rules of conduct. Although we have briefly encountered some prin-
ciples of adjudication in the preceding materials, the remainder of
this section looks more closely at the current doctrines that func-
tion as principles of adjudication. As noted previously, a large por-
tion of the principles of adjudication is contained in the culpability
(as opposed to the criminalization) mental elements of offense defi-
nitions. But other elements of current law-such as result and cau-
sation requirements-also perform the principles of adjudication
function.
7. Result elements and causation requirements.
Result elements of offense definitions-requiring the actual
occurrence of the undesirable consequence-serve the ex post
function of assessing the degree of an actor's blameworthiness.
Traditionally, greater blame is assigned to an actor who actually
causes a death, for example, than to an actor who engages in the
identical conduct with an identical state of mind but who, luckily,
does not in fact cause a death.26 The propriety of this aspect of the
doctrine has been debated.27 The point here is that the debate over
whether there is greater blameworthiness when the harm comes
about is a disagreement over principles of adjudication. So far as
the rules of conduct are concerned, there is general agreement that
the rules ought to prohibit conduct that creates a risk of certain
undesirable consequences, regardless of the fruition of those
consequences.
11 See, for example, George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 759-62 (Little,
Brown, 1978); and H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy
of Law 13-14 (Oxford, 1968). Fletcher describes a distinction in German criminal law the-
ory-between what he calls "wrongdoing" and "subject attribution"-that is similar in some
respects. See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 455.
25 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 433 (Merriam-Webster, 1986).
26 For a list of statutes providing reduced liability for attempts, see Paul H. Robinson,
Fundamentals of Criminal Law 488-89 (Little, Brown, 1988).
27 For an analysis of the impropriety of taking account of resulting harm, see Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct
in the Criminal Law, 122 U Pa L Rev 1497 (1974).
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The same analysis suggests that a causation requirement in of-
fense definitions also presents a principles of adjudication issue.
While, again, a causation requirement may resemble a rule of con-
duct's objective criteria-it is, after all, a required relation between
two objective elements, the actor's conduct and a prohibited re-
sult-the causation requirement typically adds nothing to the defi-
nition of the prohibited conduct.
Because result elements and causation requirements are not
necessary to defining the conduct prohibited by the criminal law, it
is not surprising that the presence of some form of liability rarely
depends upon them. If a prohibited result does not occur or if a
required causal connection is not established, the actor typically is
liable for a lesser offense, such as attempt. 8 This is consistent with
the conceptualization proposed here that the rules of conduct have
been violated in such cases even in the absence of the prohibited
result or causal connection.
8. Imputation of culpability mental elements.
Aside from the important exception of criminalization mental
elements noted previously, most mental elements are culpability
mental elements, which function as principles of adjudication. The
doctrines that impute culpability mental elements similarly func-
tion as principles of adjudication, since they neither expand nor
refine the prohibitions of the rules of conduct. The doctrine of vol-
untary intoxication, for example, imputes to an actor a required
awareness of a risk that he may not in fact possess." Such a doc-
trine, by imputing a culpability mental element, expands the in-
stances in which an actor's violation will be held blameworthy.
That is, culpability may arise either from consciously risking that
one's conduct is of a nature that violates a rule of conduct (e.g.,
having intercourse with a girl while aware that she may be under-
age) or consciously risking becoming intoxicated (and, therefore,
being unaware of a risk that the girl is underage).30 Other doctrines
imputing culpability mental elements include transferred intent,
" This is always true for intentional offenses in jurisdictions that have general attempt
statutes, as nearly two-thirds of the states do. See Robinson, 1 Criminal Law Defenses
§ 81(b) at 351-52 nn 16, 17, § 83(f) at 441 n 60 (cited in note 10).
" See, for example, MC § 2.08(2). For a discussion of other doctrines that impute a
required culpability, see Robinson, 93 Yale L J at 615-18 (cited in note 3).
30 Because I question the propriety of equating the second culpability with the first, I
have argued elsewhere that many voluntary intoxication cases could be resolved by imposing
liability based upon the actor's conduct and actual culpability as to the offense elements at
the time of his intoxication. See Robinson, 71 Va L Rev at 35-36 (cited in note 18).
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substituted mental elements, presumptions imputing culpability
elements, the natural and probable consequence rule in complicity,
and various forms of vicarious liability.3 1
9. Excuse defenses.
The principles of adjudication reflect a structure of presump-
tion and rebuttal similar to the criminalization and justification
doctrines of the rules of conduct. Most of the doctrines discussed
above that perform the principles of adjudication function-for ex-
ample, the culpability mental elements of offense definitions and
of doctrines imputing objective elements, and the doctrines imput-
ing culpability mental elements-establish culpability, or at least a
rebuttable presumption of it. They may be called the doctrines of
culpability. The presumption of blame created by these doctrines
can be rebutted by what may be called the doctrines of excuse.
The most common doctrines of excuse are general excuse defenses.
If the actor satisfies the conditions of a general excuse defense
at the time of the violation, his apparently culpable violation of
the rules of conduct will be held blameless. When, for example, as
a result of mental disease or defect or involuntary intoxication, a
person "lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the crimi-
nality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law,"3 2 society lowers its normative expecta-
tions of the person; thus we may hold blameless his violation of the
rules of conduct. That the violator is thirteen years old also affects
our assessment of blameworthiness and is taken into account
under an immaturity excuse.3 3 Similarly, when an actor violates
the rules of conduct because he was coerced to do so, the duress
excuse exculpates him. 4 In addition to the traditional disability
excuses of insanity, subnormality, immaturity, and duress, current
doctrine sometimes recognizes general excuses in special circum-
stances of mistake: when an actor relies upon an official misstate-
ment of the law; when an actor could not have been expected to
know the law because it was not made reasonably available; or
31 For illustrations and authorities for each of these doctrines, see Robinson, 93 Yale L
J at 615-18 (cited in note 3).
s2 MPC §§ 4.01(1), 2.08(4). Other formulations of these defenses are common. See text
and authorities in Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses § 173(a) at 280-83 (insanity formula-
tions), § 176(a) at 337-39 (general intoxication-excuse formulations) (cited in note 10).
" See, for example, MPC § 4.10 (immaturity) and authorities cited in Robinson, 2
Criminal Law Defenses § 175 at 321 (cited in note 10).
See, for example, MPC § 2.09 and authorities cited in Robinson, 2 Criminal Law
Defenses § 177 at 347 (cited in note 10).
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when the actor was (reasonably) mistaken in his belief that his
conduct was justified.3 5
Excusing conduct because of the actor's mistaken belief that
his conduct is justified merits further discussion. Some writers ar-
gue that such a mistaken justification ought to be described as jus-
tified conduct.36 That is, they would define justification defenses
subjectively; an actor would be justified if he (reasonably) believed
that his conduct was justified. As the discussion of this point in the
next section concludes, however, such a subjective formulation of
justification defenses hides the important distinction between true
(objective) justification, which serves the rules of conduct function
of advising people what they are and are not permitted to do, and
mistaken (subjective) justification, which serves the principles of
adjudication function of excusing actors who have acted under a
mistaken belief that their conduct is justified. 7
B. Examples of the Problematic Mixture of Rules of Conduct and
Principles of Adjudication
Given the extent to which current doctrine generally fails to
recognize the distinction between rules of conduct and principles
of adjudication, it is no surprise that, as has been noted, the two
functions sometimes are combined in a single doctrine. In certain
instances, the mixture can become so complete as to be
problematic.
1. Risk-creation vs. risk-taking.
Current doctrine does not distinguish between creating a risk
of causing a prohibited result (i.e., real world risk-creation) and
taking a risk that one's conduct is prohibited due to circumstances
that may exist (i.e., mental risk-taking). The former issue-real
world risk-creation-presents a rules of conduct issue: what is the
kind and degree of risk of harm that an actor is prohibited from
35 See, for example, MPC § 2.04(3)(a) and authorities cited in Robinson, 2 Criminal
Law Defenses §§ 182, 183 at 381, 386 (cited in note 10). Other general excuses recognized
include a general reasonable mistake of law defense, for example, NJ Stat Ann § 2C: 2-
4(c)(3) (West 1982); and a defense for conduct under hypnosis, for example, MPC
§ 2.01(2)(c). For a discussion of each of the excuse defenses noted in the text and their
interpretation, see Robinson, 82 Colum L Rev at 213-16 (cited in note 23).
11 See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin N. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 5.7 at 454, 457
(West, 2d ed 1986); and Greenawalt, 84 Colum L Rev at 1919-20 (cited in note 22).
See text at notes 52-57.
1990]
The University of Chicago Law Review
creating?18 The latter issue-mental risk-taking-presents a culpa-
bility issue: when is an actor to be held blameworthy for "taking a
risk" that his conduct violates the rules of conduct? The distinc-
tion is between creating a risk of causing a harm and taking a risk
of violating a rule.
"Recklessness" offenses are an example of an area of current
doctrine that confuses the two types of risk. One form of reckless-
ness is the intentional creation of a risk of harm. For example, in-
tentionally creating a risk of death appears to be punished as reck-
less homicide where the death occurs and as intentional
endangerment where it does not. e This punishes real world risk-
creation, for which the rules of conduct must define the extent and
nature of the prohibited risks. A different form of recklessness is
consciously disregarding a risk that one's behavior constitutes a
rules of conduct violation. An actor shoots at a shadow behind a
shade, unsure whether it is a welcome neighbor or his unwelcome
dog. He is certain to achieve his goal of causing death; his reckless-
ness goes to whether the death will be one that is prohibited by the
rules of conduct-the death of a human being. This mental risk-
taking is, like real world risk-creation, punished as reckless homi-
cide, but only if the shadow turns out to be that of a human. Oth-
erwise, there is no liability. The recklessness required by offenses
without result elements generally is of the mental risk-taking, not
real world, risk-creation, sort. Statutory rape, for example, punishes
mental risk-taking as to a sexual partner's age.40 If the partner is
" There is no comparable risk-creation for violations that do not involve causing a pro-
hibited result. Where the prohibition is defined only in terms of conduct in certain circum-
stances, the circumstance either exists or it does not. One does not create a risk of a circum-
stance; one can only take a risk that a circumstance exists. That is, one acts in disregard (or
ignorance) of therisk that the circumstance exists. Such mental risk-taking is an issue of
culpability.
39 For example, an actor may dump a hazardous chemical in an abandoned mine shaft
knowing or intending that he thereby creates a risk that the chemical will leak and cause
death. The risk is created by the actor's conduct of dumping. Such intentional risk-creation
is punished under the Model Penal Code's endangerment offense, § 211.2. It is punished no
more severely than recklessly creating the same risk. Section 211.2 does not increase the
grade of the offense if a culpability greater than the required recklessness is proven. Risk-
creation also is punished under offenses that prohibit engaging in specified conduct. See, for
example, NJ Stat Ann § 2C:12-1(b)(4) (West Cum Supp 1987-88) (offense to knowingly
point a firearm in the direction of another); compare MPC § 211.2 (pointing a firearm at
another creates a rebuttable presumption of the recklessness and danger required for reck-
less endangerment).
40 Many jurisdictions punish not only such conscious mental risk-taking but also an
actor's failure to be sufficiently aware of a risk that his conduct might be a violation-i.e.,
negligence as to a sexual partner's age. Under the Model Penal Code, for example, an actor
is liable if he is negligent as to his partner being less than sixteen years old (and the actor is
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underage, the rules of conduct have been violated; if the partner is
not underage, there is no violation.41 If it turns out that there is a
violation, the principles of adjudication must then determine
whether the actor is blameworthy for acting despite his awareness
of a risk that his conduct was prohibited.42
Section IV of this article describes the difficulties and errors
that come from drafting rules of conduct in the form appropriate
for principles of adjudication and vice versa. The failure to distin-
guish the two forms of recklessness inevitably leads to such errors.
The failure also raises questions about the substantive doctrine.
Should the person who intentionally creates a risk of death of a
human being (by dumping toxic waste where it might leak into a
water supply) be treated the same as the person who engages in
conduct certain to cause the death of what he mentally risks is a
human being (by shooting point blank at the shadow behind the
shade)? Further, if reckless homicide (manslaughter) statutes4 are
intended to punish either kind of recklessness, are they also in-
tended to punish both kinds together? Is it reckless homicide that
one acted in conscious disregard of a substantial risk that one's
conduct created a substantial risk of causing death (mental risk-
taking as to real world risk-creation)? 44 Should this person be sub-
ject to the same liability as the person who intends to cause such a
risk, and the person who mentally risks certain death? All three
may be convicted of the same offense, reckless homicide, but one
might argue that one or more ought to have different degrees of
liability.
at least 4 years older than his partner). MPC § 213.3(1)(a). Model Penal Code § 213.6(1)
provides that only a "reasonable" belief-in other words, non-negligent belief, per
§ 1.13(16)-is a defense. This, of course, also is a culpability issue, not a real world risk-
creation issue.
41 Unless, of course, the jurisdiction imposes liability for impossible attempts. For a
discussion of the special subjective nature of the attempt rule of conduct, see text at notes
10-14.
42 More accurately, liability for mental risk-taking arises from acting despite an aware-
ness of a risk of the circumstances that in fact make one's conduct prohibited; an actor
need not be aware of a risk that his conduct is prohibited. As Model Penal Code § 2.02(9)
illustrates, knowledge of criminality is not normally required for liability.
13 A person is guilty of manslaughter if he "recklessly causes the death of another
human being." MPC §§ 210.1(1), 210.3(1)(a).
4' Some offenses more clearly are intended to punish both kinds of recklessness, even
together. Reckless endangerment and risking catastrophe, for example, impose liability on
an actor who engages in conduct creating a risk of harm while aware that his conduct is
creating that risk. See, for example, MPC §§ 211.1, 220.2(2). Creating the risk of harm vio-
lates the rules of conduct; the actor's disregarding his awareness of a risk that his conduct is
prohibited makes him culpable for the violation.
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Another example of current confusion in the area of criminal
risk is the use of overlapping rules of conduct. Because current
doctrine does not distinguish rules of conduct from principles of
adjudication, it commonly uses two offenses to prohibit the same
conduct, offenses that are distinguishable only by the presence of
resulting harm (a factor relating to the principles of adjudication).
For example, as noted above, reckless homicide and intentional en-
dangerment each prohibit the same conduct: creating a risk of
death. If offense definitions are taken by the public as the rules of
conduct, the use of two separate offenses may suggest that two dif-
ferent kinds of conduct are prohibited, which is not true.
The confusion is heightened where the two overlapping of-
fenses use different standards to define the illegal conduct. For ex-
ample, the Model Penal Code punishes only the creation of a "sub-
stantial risk"'45 when the risk comes to fruition, but where it
happily does not come to fruition, the Code does not specify the
prohibited degree of risk.46 Presumably it could be less than a sub-
stantial risk. If the goal is to establish rules of conduct to shape
individual behavior, it seems inappropriate to use a standard that
varies depending on the occurrence of a result, a subsequent event
over which the actor has no control. At the time of acting, the ac-
tor cannot know whether the harm will actually occur. Therefore,
an actor cannot know which of the two overlapping prohibitions he
is violating. The different standards (and different threatened
sanctions) send a confusing message: if you take a risk less than a
substantial risk, you will be liable only for the risk-creation, even if
the harm comes about; but if you take a substantial risk, you will
be subject to greater liability if the harm comes about. A more ra-
tional approach would define different offenses and attach differ-
ent degrees of liability depending on the degree of risk created.
This unsystematic definition of prohibitions also means that
conduct creating a risk frequently will be prohibited and punished
only if the harm comes about. For example, an actor will be liable
(under a subsection of the assault offense) for creating a risk of
bodily injury if the injury results, but he will not be liable for cre-
ating the same risk of injury if he is lucky and the injury never
45 MPC § 2.02(2)(c),(d).
4' See, for example, the requirement of simply creating a "danger" of death in MPC
§ 211.2.
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occurs." ' Writers may disagree as to whether, all other things being
equal, a resulting harm should increase liability,4 8 but there seems
little reason to think that a resulting harm should be a minimum
requirement for liability.4' A rational system would establish a rule
of conduct that prohibits the creation of a risk of harm of a de-
fined seriousness (or create a series of offenses defined by the mag-
nitude of the risks created). Then, if desired, the system could im-
pose a greater punishment upon a violation where the result
actually occurs. Current doctrine anomalously makes the prohibi-
tion of a risk depend upon whether the harm actually comes about,
a fact that the actor cannot know at the time he creates the risk.
2. Justification vs. mistake as to justification.
Another illustration of the problematic mixture of rules of
conduct and principles of adjudication is found in the common
practice of combining justification and mistaken justification in a
single defense. Conduct that is actually, objectively justified is con-
sistent with the rules of conduct. Such conduct is to be publicly
approved and encouraged (or at least tolerated) under similar cir-
cumstances in the future. Conduct that is not actually, objectively
justified violates the rules of conduct and should be avoided by
others under similar circumstances in the future, although the vio-
lator at hand may be excused if his reasonable mistake as to the
justification of his conduct makes him blameless. Thus, a defense
47 If the injury occurs, liability will be imposed under MPC § 211.1(1)(a) (assault). The
offense of reckless endangerment only prohibits placing another person in danger of "death
or serious bodily injury." MPC § 211.2.
,8 Some writers would object to any differential in liability based upon the presence or
absence of a resulting harm. See, for example, Schulhofer, 122 U Pa L Rev 1497 (cited in
note 27). But most jurisdictions distinguish liability for the completed offense from a mere
attempt. See the authorities collected in Robinson, Fundamentals of Criminal Law at 488-
89 (cited in note 26). See also John H. Mansfield, Hart and Honore, Causation in the
Law-A Comment, 17 Vand L Rev 487, 494-95 (1964) (claiming strong intuitive support for
a distinction based upon resulting harm).
49 My article, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal
Liability, 23 UCLA L Rev 266 (1975), has been misinterpreted as a call for a physical harm
prerequisite to criminal liability. See, for example, Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Danger-
ousness, and Harm: Balancing the Factors on Which Our Criminal Law is Predicated, 66
NC L Rev 283, 288 (1988) (treating the concept of "harm" used by Robinson as if it related
to the harmful physical consequences found in offenses such as homicide). But as my defini-
tion of the term "societal harm" makes clear, it includes not only physical but also intangi-
ble harm-damage, injury, detriment, and loss of any kind to tangible or intangible inter-
ests. Robinson, 23 UCLA L Rev at 267 n 7. For a supporting view, see also Jerome H. Hall,
General Principles of Criminal Law 214 (Bobbs-Merrill, 2d ed 1960).
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for mistaken justification serves as a principle of adjudication, not
a rule of conduct.
By treating mistaken conduct as "justified," current doctrine
creates an ambiguity that risks distorting the true rules of conduct.
An acquittal described as justified, but actually based on a mistake
as to a justification, sends an unclear message of the rule of con-
duct: Do the rules permit what the actor actually did or just what
he thought he was doing, or both? Giving the same "justification"
defense to both the objectively justified actor and the mistaken ac-
tor leaves the ambiguity dangerously unresolved in every case. A
case of mistaken justification might be misinterpreted as a case of
true justification, thereby approving conduct that ought to be pro-
hibited.50 Meanwhile, an actual justification-involving desirable
conduct-might be misinterpreted by the public (and deci-
sionmakers) as a mistaken justification involving undesirable con-
duct, thereby distorting the rules to discourage desirable conduct.5 '
This difficulty occurs in jurisdictions, such as those adopting
the Model Penal Code, that label conduct under a mistaken justifi-
cation "justified" conduct.5 2 The difficulty can be avoided by
adopting an objective theory of justification and a separate excuse
for the mistaken actor, for this properly distinguishes the two cases
and permits a clear communication of the rules of conduct. Thus I
have argued elsewhere that the doctrines of justification should be
formulated in an objective rather than subjective form: that is,
based upon the objective circumstances and not upon the actor's
state of mind.5 3 1 continue to believe that subjective justifications
50 It is for fear of this mistake that many appropriate reasonable mistakes as to justifi-
cation are denied excuse. See note 87, discussing such compensating distortions in fairness
doctrines.
51 Nor is there an opportunity to determine, in a given case, which message is meant to
be conveyed by the acquittal-no violation or a blameless violation. Under the present sys-
tem, no one other than the individual juror can tell whether the verdict is intended to mean
that the actor's conduct was not a violation or was a non-blameworthy violation of the rules.
Indeed, the jury instructions would not call for deliberation on the issue; and thus there
may well be no single group view developed among the jurors. One juror may vote for ac-
quittal because she judges there to be no violation of the rules of conduct; another may vote
for acquittal because he finds a violation but judges it blameless. In other words, the system
does not require a determination of whether the conduct is a violation, and thus there may
be no message to convey at all.
5' See authorities cited at Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses § 184(b)(1) at 399-402
(cited in note 10).
11 Robinson, 23 UCLA L Rev 266 (cited in note 49); Robinson, 2 Criminal Law De-
fenses § 122 at 12 (cited in note 10). I also continue to support only attempt liability for the
unknowingly justified actor and only in those jurisdictions that punish legally impossible
attempts. Robinson, 23 UCLA L Rev at 291; Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses at
§ 122(d). Such liability for the unknowingly justified actor does not require the subjectivica-
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cannot provide the unambiguous and invariant rules needed to
guide the conduct of all persons;54 only objective justifications can
perform this function.
Many codes and some writers insist on defining justifications
subjectively-i.e., they argue that one ought to be justified if one
(reasonably) believes that one's conduct is justified.5 According to
this argument, the actor has behaved properly; to convict him is to
improperly disapprove of his conduct as he saw it. One writer gives
the example of the Young case, in which the actor bravely inter-
vened to help defend a youth being beaten by two men, only to be
charged with criminal assault for interfering with an arrest. The
writer observes:
Actions like Young's should not be the subject of criminal lia-
bility, but the question here is whether they should be labeled
justified or excused. Young is to be praised, not blamed, for
what he did, and members of society would wish that others
faced with similar situations requiring instant judgment
would act as Young did. A moral assessment of Young's act
would treat it as justified. 6
This analysis incorrectly assumes that only a justification defense
is appropriate for an actor who does what is morally right (given
tion of the doctrines of justification. It can be imposed, without alteration of existing stat-
utes, under the general attempt provision. That is, attempts subjective component of the
rules of conduct would punish attempted violations of the rules of conduct that arose not
only from attempted violations of the doctrines of criminalization but also from attempted
violations of the doctrines of justification. A general attempt provision typically imposes
liability when an actor engages in conduct that would be an offense "if the attendant cir-
cunstances were as he believes them to be." MPC § 5.01(1)(a).
"One might argue that mistaken justification limited to reasonable mistakes, where
the reasonableness is determined on a purely objective basis, also would provide invariant
rules of conduct as effectively as objective justification. But the argument is misleading.
Mistaken justification, so defined, is objective justification. If the mistaken justification de-
fense is to be based upon the circumstances as they actually exist rather than upon the
circumstances known to the actor, then the defense is in fact an objective, actual justifica-
tion defense, not a mistake defense. A reasonable judgment on the actual facts is objective
justification. On the other hand, if the mistaken justification defense is to be based upon the
facts known to the actor, then it has been individualized in a way that makes it ineffective
as a rule of conduct. When the actual circumstances come out at trial, an acquittal based
upon such a mistaken justification might be taken to improperly condone conduct that in
fact ought to be avoided in the future.
" See MPC §§ 3.02, 3.04-3.07; and authorities cited in Robinson, 2 Criminal Law De-
fenses § 184 at 395 (cited in note 10).
54 Greenawalt, 84 Colum L Rev at 1919-20 (cited in note 22) (emphasis added). See also
MPC Art 3; and Greenawalt, 84 Colum L Rev at 1908. The case is reported at 11 NY2d 274,
183 NE2d 319 (1962).
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his view of the circumstances). But an excuse defense, even under
current conceptions, also would judge the actor blameless.
The writer might respond, however, that it is Young's act that
should be judged proper, not just Young. This is important be-
cause, as he explains, we want "others faced with similar situations
[to] act as Young did." But the reasoning is flawed. It assumes that
Young's act must be deemed justified, despite his mistake as to the
actual circumstances, if future actors faced with similar situations
are to be encouraged to act as Young did. The fact is that the fu-
ture actor who believes he has come upon the mugging of an inno-
cent youth will be encouraged to act by a rule of conduct that al-
lows a (true) objective justification defense, the right to defend
another from an unjustified attack. The future actor will not be
deterred by the absence of a justification for the mistaken actor
because he (the future actor) believes that the circumstances are
such that his intervention actually is justified. That a mistake as to
a justification is only excused is not of any relevance to him; he is
actually justified, he believes. He may take some comfort in the
fact that he nonetheless may be excused if his belief in his justifi-
cation turns out to be mistaken-the existence of an excuse for a
mistaken justification may thus be useful-but the rule of conduct
need only protect actually (objectively) justified behavior in order
to encourage future actors to act in situations where intervention
appears to them to be justified.5 7
C. Some Classification Challenges
To complete this review of the more important aspects of cur-
rent doctrine, and to sharpen the distinction between rules of con-
duct and principles of adjudication, consider which of the two
functions-rules of conduct or principles of adjudication-are
57 From the perspective of objective justification, it is entirely predictable that Greena-
walt would conclude that the borders of justification and excuse are "perplexing," as the
title of his article suggests. Greenawalt, 84 Colum L Rev at 1897 (cited in note 22). By
defining justifications to include reasonably mistaken justifications, his attempt to distin-
guish justification and excuse is an attempt to distinguish mistaken justifications from ex-
cuses, which cannot be successfully done, I believe, because mistaken justifications are ex-
cuses. I believe that his conclusion, that the doctrine ought not systematically embody the
justification-excuse distinction, must be qualified. The justification-excuse distinction is
troublesome only if one adopts a subjective theory of justification, as Greenawalt does. Most
if not all of his troublesome cases are clear and unproblematic under an objective theory of
justification. In fact, one might conclude that the point he has demonstrated in his article is
not the perplexing borders of justification and excuse, but rather that the perplexing bor-
ders created by the use of a subjective theory suggest a preference for the comparative con-
ceptual clarity of an objective theory.
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served by the consent defense and the defense for de minimis
infractions.
1. The consent defense.
Some instances of consent undercut the offensive nature of
conduct and seem clearly part of the rules of conduct doctrines of
criminalization.5 8 If the owner has given consent to enter his build-
ing, the entry is not trespass; it is not unlicensed. No special con-
sent defense is required; the trespass offense prohibits only unli-
censed entries.5 9 One might take a similar view of a football player
who tackles another player during a game. The rules of conduct
are not violated; the consent of the other player brings the assault
within the rules of acceptable conduct. On the other hand, one
might concede that consent relieves the actor of liability but argue
that, in the case of the football assault, consent vitiates liability by
justifying or excusing the assault.
But consent is clearly not an excuse. The football tackle is eas-
ily distinguishable from the excused attack of a madman or of one
who mistakenly believes he is justified. Unlike these attacks, the
tackle is fully acceptable, even desirable, conduct. We are more
than happy to see the conduct repeated for as long as the consent
remains in force.
The claim that consent is a justification, which has been made
by at least one writer,60 is less obviously wrong. One could argue
that the tackle is within the rules of conduct because the harm is
outweighed by the greater good that derives from the game, and
the game is possible only because of the "victim's" consent to the
assault. The tackle is similar to other justifications, it could be ar-
gued, in that the circumstances render the otherwise unacceptable
conduct acceptable.
But on closer scrutiny this, too, seems incorrect. Consent to
the football assault is not a matter of justification but rather of
non-criminalization, as with a consent defense to trespass. Justified
s For a description of consent defenses, see Robinson, 1 Criminal Law Defenses § 66 at
307-11 nn 2, 15, 20 (cited in note 10). See also MPC § 2.11.
11 See, for example, MPC § 221.2(1) (defining criminal trespass to include the element
that entry was "not licensed"; the consent of the owner would mean that this element could
not be proven). Model Penal Code § 2.11(1) confirms, perhaps unnecessarily, that consent is
a defense when, as here, it "negatives an element of the offense."
60 See, for example, George P. Fletcher, A Crime of Self Defense: Bernard Goetz and
the Law on Trial 19 (Free Press, 1988); and Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 705-06,
769 (cited in note 24) (arguing that consent operates as a justification rather than as a nega-
tive element of an offense); but see id at 707 (conceding some doubts).
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conduct is acceptable conduct, given the circumstances, but it is
hoped that the justifying circumstances will not occur again. In
contrast, the circumstances of consensual conduct evoke no such
disapproval. The entire event leading up to the consensual tackle
is acceptable and not something to be avoided in the future. Con-
sistent with this difference in the acceptability of the episode is the
fact that the creation of justifying circumstances ought to be and
typically is a violation of the rules of conduct." In contrast, it is
not a violation to hold a football game, to have consensual inter-
course, or to engage in most other conduct that is acceptable be-
cause it is consensual.
2. De minimis violations.
Another doctrine that presents a classification challenge is the
defense for a de minimis violation. The defense might be seen as
refining the criminalization doctrines of the rules of conduct by
limiting them to harms of sufficient seriousness. For example, un-
authorized takings are prohibited by theft offenses. An actor who
leaves a restaurant with an apple from a buffet after paying for the
buffet, but in violation of the establishment's rule against removal
of food, technically may violate the theft prohibition. 2 Yet, the vi-
olation may be too trivial, or at least too close to the range of ac-
ceptable conduct, to warrant criminalization. One court reversed a
conviction for the theft of three pieces of bubble gum for similar
reasons.
63
61 For a general discussion of liability for causing justifying circumstances, see Robin-
son, 71 Va L Rev at 30-36 (cited in note 18). For a bizarre example, see Bailey v Common-
wealth, 229 Va 258, 329 SE2d 37 (1985) (After angry verbal exchanges by telephone during
which the defendant intentionally provoked the victim by calling his war hero, General
George S. Patton, a homosexual, defendant told victim to arm himself and to wait on his
porch because he was coming over; he then anonymously called the police to report a man
waving a gun around, and the police officers who went to the house justifiably killed the
victim when he threatened one of them, mistakenly believing that it was the defendant
coming to shoot him; defendant's conviction for manslaughter was affirmed.).
02 See State v Nevens, 197 NJ Super 531, 485 A2d 345 (1984).
6' State v Smith, 195 NJ Super 468, 480 A2d 236 (1984). The court explains:
In the milieu of bubble gum pilferage the only cases more trivial are those involving
two pieces or one. It is difficult to conclude the lawmakers would have intended the
dividing line be drawn at three. It would seem the larceny of a single piece of bubble
gum would fall within the statutory intendment of a trivial offense. Does then the theft
of three pieces remove the actor's conduct from the scope of discretionary protection
afforded [by the de minimis defense]? In a case involving substantially different con-
duct and attending circumstances perhaps it would; in this case it does not.
480 A2d at 240.
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On the other hand, one may ask: Is it that a de minimis viola-
tion is too trivial to be a violation of the rules of conduct, or is
such a violation, in the words of the Model Penal Code, too trivial
"to warrant the condemnation of conviction"?64 I believe the latter
is the case. Stealing the bubble gum or taking the apple is a viola-
tion; the rules of conduct ought to tell an actor not to engage in
such conduct. But if an actor does, the harm or evil is not sufficient
to merit criminal condemnation. The rules of conduct are
breached; persons ought not feel free to steal bubble gum or take
apples in the future. But while de minimis infractions may violate
the rules of conduct, they do not give rise to sufficient blamewor-
thiness under the adjudicatory principles of blame to merit
conviction.
D. Summary
To summarize, the doctrinal issues relating to the rules of con-
duct and the principles of adjudication, respectively, are:
RULES OF CONDUCT PRINCIPLES OF
ADJUDICATION
Doctrines of Criminalization Doctrines of Culpability
Primary Prohibitions: Conduct and Culpability mental elements of primary
circumstance elements and criminaliza- and secondary prohibitions
tion mental elements of primary
prohibitions Result elements and causation require-
ments
Secondary Prohibitions: Conduct
and circumstance elements and Doctrines imputing culpability mental
criminalization mental elements of sec- elements (e.g., voluntary intoxication)
ondary prohibitions (secondary prohibi-
tions include inchoate offenses and
doctrines, such as complicity, that im-
pute an objective element)
Obligations: Duties to act (upon
which omission liability may be based)
Criminalization Refinements: Con-
sent defenses
- MPC § 2.12(2).
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Doctrines of Justification Doctrines of Excuse
(Objective) justification defenses (de- Voluntary act requirement in commis-
fensive force justifications, public au- sion offenses and capacity requirement
thority justifications, and lesser evils in omission liability
defense)
Excuse defenses (e.g., insanity, imma-
turity, involuntary intoxication)
Mistake as to a justification excuse
(including subjective requirements con-
tained in justification defenses)
The rules of conduct are contained in the doctrines of
criminalization and the doctrines of justification. The former doc-
trines include the conduct, circumstance, and criminalization
mental elements of the primary prohibitions-which are typically
contained in the definitions of specific offenses-and of the sec-
ondary prohibitions, which expand the law's prohibition to include
attempting, assisting another in, or otherwise causing or furthering
a violation of a primary prohibition. Refinements to the criminal-
ization doctrines are contained in consent defenses. The doctrines
of criminalization also include affirmative duties to act.
The doctrines of justification, consisting primarily of the justi-
fication defenses, admit a violation of a doctrine of criminalization
but acquit an actor because his behavior remains within the rules
of conduct. Such conduct is acceptable and may properly be re-
peated by others in similar justifying circumstances. Together, the
doctrines of criminalization and justification provide society's
statement of the rules of conduct.
The principles of adjudication include the doctrines of culpa-
bility and excuse. The doctrines of culpability attach blameworthi-
ness, primarily by assessing whether the actor's state of mind with
regard to his conduct and the circumstances surrounding the of-
fense is such that the actor would normally be judged culpable for
his violation. The existence of a harmful result from an actor's con-
duct may also increase the actor's blameworthiness. The doctrines
of excuse determine whether there might be some abnormality in
the particular actor or his situation that suggests blamelessness de-
spite the presumption of blame created by the doctrines of
culpability.
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In contrast to acquittals under the rules of conduct doctrines,
which announce that the actor's conduct is not a violation of the
rules, acquittals under the adjudication doctrines announce that
the conduct continues to be a violation of the rules, although this
actor is not to be punished for his violation. Similarly, the de
minimis nature of a violation may so reduce an actor's blamewor-
thiness as to render it too trivial for condemnation by criminal
conviction.
Current doctrine's tendency to mix rules of conduct and prin-
ciples of adjudication-in objective elements of offenses, in mental
elements of offenses, in doctrines of imputation, in omission liabil-
ity doctrines, and in general defenses-reflects its general failure to
adequately distinguish these different functions. As Section III de-
scribes, the two functions have different doctrinal needs. Neither
can be served effectively unless the underlying doctrines are for-
mulated to meet its special needs.6 5
65 The conceptualization proposed here provides at least part of the answer to a central
question in criminal law theory. Fletcher suggests that the "unmet challenge of criminal
theory consists in working out" the distinction between the "incriminating dimension of
crime" and "the exculpatory dimension of justification and excuse." George P. Fletcher, The
Unmet Challenge of Criminal Theory, 33 Wayne L Rev 1439, 1443 (1987). Fletcher's gen-
eral challenge to develop a conceptual structure for criminal law doctrine is important and
deserves the attention of serious criminal law theorists. But the particular formulation of his
challenge may be misleading in its assumptions. Fletcher's challenge to define and distin-
guish the "incriminating dimension of crime" from the "exculpatory dimension of justifica-
tion and excuse" assumes that the incriminating-exculpating distinction is the distinction of
central importance and, further, that the conceptual structure should treat justifications and
excuses together, as providing the "exculpatory dimension." These assumptions are, I be-
lieve, incorrect. As Fletcher notes with regard to intent and negligence as compared to acci-
dent and mistake, doctrines need only be stated as converse elements to change their char-
acter from inculpatory to exculpatory. Fletcher, 33 Wayne L Rev at 1443. The affirmative
requirements of intent and negligence might be viewed as easily as the defenses of accident
and mistake. Defenses, even general defenses of justification and excuse, similarly might be
defined as negative elements of offenses. Given its manipulable nature, some additional re-
finement is needed before we can assume that the conceptual structure of criminal law
ought to revolve around the inculpation-exculpation distinction, and that justification and
excuse must be treated together as the "exculpatory dimension."
The central distinction for criminal law theory, proposed in this article, is not that be-
tween inculpation and exculpation but rather between rules of conduct and principles of
adjudication. This conceptualization neither abandons the inculpation-exculpation distinc-
tion nor disagrees with the claim that the doctrines of justification and excuse may be
viewed as analogous in a sense. It does suggest, however, that the inculpation-exculpation
distinction is of secondary importance, and that the doctrines of justification and excuse
"exculpate" in different ways. Violation of a doctrine of criminalization does not imply guilt;
thus, a doctrine of justification does not "exculpate" from guilt, but serves only to rebut a
presumption that an actor's conduct is in violation of the rules of conduct. The doctrines of
justification and excuse are analogous, however, in that each serves to rebut a presumption
that otherwise would establish one of the two prerequisites to liability-violation of the
rules of conduct and an adjudication of blameworthiness for the violation.
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III. THE NEED FOR DIFFERENT DRAFTING STRATEGIES FOR RULES
OF CONDUCT AND PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATION
A. Drafting Strategies
There are many important differences between the rules of
conduct and principles of adjudication functions of the criminal
law. For example, as noted previously, rules of conduct make ex
ante announcements while principles of adjudication allocate
blame ex post for a violation of those rules. Other important differ-
ences are the audiences they address and the settings in which
they are applied. The rules of conduct must be communicated to
the general public in a form that all can understand and apply.
They frequently must be applied in unanticipated situations with
little opportunity for reflection or analysis. The main audience for
the principles of adjudication, on the other hand, are the deci-
sionmakers in the criminal justice process, primarily prosecutors,
judges, and juries.6 These persons can be given specialized instruc-
tion for application of the governing principles. Further, the ex
post nature of the blame inquiry permits time for research, reflec-
tion, and debate before the principles are applied. 7 Finally, the
nature and quality of the tasks are substantively different. The
rules of conduct function is essentially descriptive, to describe for
the public what they cannot, or can, or must do. The principles of
adjudication function is essentially judgmental, to judge the
blameworthiness of an actor who has violated a rule of conduct.
The differences between the two functions-ex ante versus ex
post application, public versus specialized audiences, (potentially)
immediate versus studied application, and descriptive versus judg-
mental nature of the functions-suggest the need to use different
doctrinal forms in implementing the two functions. It is essential
that the rules of conduct be easily accessible to the public and be
in a form that maximizes clarity and ease of application. Besides
simplicity and brevity, the use of an invariant standard with objec-
tive criteria is desirable to avoid the unpredictability, vagueness,
86 I say "main" audience because the general public will eventually hear of and must
approve of the results generated by the principles of adjudication. On this important point I
am unpersuaded by Dan-Cohen's arguments for "acoustical separation." See Dan-Cohen, 97
Harv L Rev at 634-37, 665-67 (cited in note 1) (arguing that the criminal law does and
should provide "acoustic separation" between conduct rules and decision rules).
0' See Paul H. Robinson, Legality and Discretion in the Distribution of Criminal
Sanctions, 25 Harv J Leg 393, 400-07 (1988).
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and ambiguity that follow from individualized or subjective
standards."s
The principles of adjudication call for a very different doctri-
nal form. Because the decisionmakers applying the principles of
adjudication after the violation can be specially trained, allowed
time for thoughtful application, and provided access to research
and counsel, there is less need for simplicity and easy application.
In fact, to take account of all the factors relevant to a judgment of
blameworthiness, doctrines embodying principles of adjudication
frequently must be complex, based on subjective criteria, and ex-
pressed in relatively vague and judgmental standards.
B. Drafting Rules of Conduct
Some illustrations from current law will confirm the need for
different drafting strategies for rules of conduct and principles of
adjudication. Consider current homicide provisions. To the lay
reader, the California scheme, which is typical of the codified com-
mon law approach, must be close to a meaningless jumble. For
example:
[M]alice may be express or implied. It is express when there is
manifested a deliberate intention .... It is implied, when no
considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart
... .Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within the
general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such
awareness is included within the definition of malice.69
The Model Penal Code homicide provisions are more simple
but also confusing. The Code's language includes various culpable
" In the definition of criminal risks, for example, the typical current formulation fol-
lows the Model Penal Code in individualizing the definition of the kind of risk that is pro-
hibited by the rules of conduct. For example, a person is guilty of manslaughter "if he...
recklessly causes the death of another human being." MPC §§ 210.1(1), 210.3(1)(a). A per-
son acts "recklessly" with regard to causing death when he creates or disregards "a substan-
tial... risk that [a death] will result from his conduct and the risk is of such a nature and
degree that, considering... the circumstances known to [the actor], its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a [law-abiding person/reasonable person]
would observe in the actor's situation." (emphasis added) In other words, the nature of the
prohibited risk is defined in terms of the individual actor. Thus, the risks that are prohib-
ited will be different for any given actor, depending upon "the circumstances known to him"
and his "situation." Under such a subjective formulation, no actor can know with any cer-
tainty whether a given risk will be criminal for that actor to create. This is an example of a
problem arising from the mixture of rules of conduct and principles of adjudication in a
single doctrine. See text accompanying notes 38-49.
'9 Cal Penal Code § 188 (West 1988).
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states of mind-"extreme emotional disturbance," "recklessness
manifesting extreme indifference"-and describes degrees of homi-
cide, none of which is required to state the rule of conduct.70 These
factors serve only to establish the existence and degree of blame-
worthiness, functions of the principles of adjudication.
In contrast to these inaccessible provisions, the rule of conduct
at the heart of the offense of murder can be stated simply: "No
person shall engage in conduct that creates a risk of death to an-
other person." A similar simplicity and brevity can be achieved in
drafting the rules of conduct for most offenses. Most forms of theft
can be summarized in the prohibition, "No person shall take, exer-
cise control over, or transfer property of another without consent
of the owner." The rules prohibiting most forms of improper sex-
ual conduct can be stated as, "No person shall engage in inter-
course or make sexual contact with or expose his genitals to an-
other person without such other person's consent." A second
provision can define the conditions in which valid consent cannot
lawfully be given.71
The current formulation of generalized secondary prohibitions
reflects the same obfuscation of relatively simple rules of conduct.
The multi-page provisions on complicity and attempt 7 2 for exam-
ple, can be replaced for the purposes of the rules of conduct with
such simple statements as: "No person shall engage in conduct
that assists another person in conduct that would be a violation [of
the rules of conduct]"; "no person shall attempt to engage in con-
duct that would constitute a violation [of the rules of conduct]."
The justification doctrines illustrate a different problem under
current codes. The defensive force provisions, for example, are
commonly formulated as a series of detailed rules, exceptions, and
exceptions to the exceptions for each of a variety of specific situa-
tions.3 While such detail may be useful and feasible in a principle
of adjudication, thoughtfully applied by trained decisionmakers, it
seems unrealistic to expect the average citizen to know these spe-
cialized rules, let alone to follow them in the threatening situations
that call for the use of defensive force. The general requirements
that defensive conduct be "necessary to protect the person or
property" and "proportional to the harm threatened" are adequate
70 See MPC §§ 210.2-210.4.
" For an example of a provision delineating circumstances under which consent to sex-
ual intercourse cannot be given, see MPC § 213.3(1).
72 See, for example, MPC §§ 2.06, 5.01.
71 See, for example, MPC §§ 3.04(2), 3.05, 3.06.
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to convey the elements of justification and realistic in terms of
what can be effectively communicated. 4
To summarize, rules of conduct should be drafted separately
from principles of adjudication, using invariant standards and ob-
jective criteria. In that form, the rules can be simple and brief. The
brevity means that the rules can be widely disseminated. The sim-
plicity means that they realistically can be taught to and under-
stood by the general public. 5
C. Drafting Principles of Adjudication
Separate documents, or "codes," for rules of conduct and prin-
ciples of adjudication also could improve the accuracy and effec-
tiveness of the latter. Many of the complex drafting forms that are
problematic for rules of conduct are unproblematic, and frequently
useful, in the context of principles of blame. For example, the com-
plexity of the voluntary intoxication provisions"6 would make them
unworkable as rules of conduct, but in fact is entirely acceptable
considering that such provisions actually operate as principles of
adjudication. The language of the Model Penal Code causation
provision-"too remote or accidental ... to have a [just] bearing
on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense" 7 7-similarly
would be unacceptably vague and discretionary as a rule of con-
duct, but is appropriate because it actually serves as a principle of
adjudication.
Many other doctrines currently adjudicating blame, however,
use forms that are inappropriate for their function. Some use ob-
jective criteria or fail to adequately individualize an objective stan-
dard. In each instance, the form may be appropriate for a rule of
conduct. One suspects that an insensitivity to the difference in the
functions of rules of conduct and principles of adjudication is
partly responsible for the inappropriately objective or invariant
formulation.
7' For authorities on and a discussion of these necessity and proportionality require-
ments, see Robinson, 82 Colum L Rev at 213-20 (cited in note 23).
71 Grammar school and high school programs might study the rules of conduct, with
discussion of illustrative applications to common situations. While against our tradition of
complex codes this proposal may sound impractical and unrealistic, rules of conduct that
are simply stated and easily read could be published in a government pamphlet for wide
distribution.
7' See, for example, MPC § 2.08.
7MPC §§ 2.03(2)(b),(3)(b).
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A modern immaturity defense, for example, typically is availa-
ble to an actor at or below a specific age.7 8 Such an age cut-off
formulation of the defense makes it easy to apply, but results in a
failure to excuse an older actor who is as immature as a typical
under-age actor and for whom, consequently, we have reduced nor-
mative expectations. In State v Jamison, for example, the defend-
ant was denied an immaturity defense, despite his "mental age" of
11.7 years, because his chronological age of seventeen put him over
the statutory cut-off for the immaturity defense. 9 An immaturity
defense formulated as an age cut-off also creates the converse
problem of understating our normative expectations for the fully
mature but underage actor. As long as the actor's chronological age
is less than the statutory cut-off, the excuse will obtain, even if he
is sufficiently mature to be reasonably expected to avoid the viola-
tion. Thus, application of the defense is reduced to timing dis-
putes. In Parker v State, for example, the defendant noted that he
committed the offense at 9:45 a.m. on his birthday but that he was
not born until 12:50 p.m. that day. Thus, he argued, he had not yet
reached the cut-off age.80
Objective, easy to apply criteria are critical for a rule of con-
duct but are not necessary for a principle of adjudication. It is not
that such criteria are inherently problematic; ease in application is
always a virtue. Rather, objective criteria can be troublesome when
incorporated into principles of adjudication because assessments of
blameworthiness frequently require subjective or discretionary cri-
teria. In the case of the immaturity excuse, for example, a defense
that looked to the actor's actual degree of immaturity would be
more consistent with inquiring into moral culpability. If a conces-
sion to easier application is needed, it could be made by using re-
buttable presumptions, rather than the essentially irrebuttable
78 See authorities cited in Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses § 175 at 321-24 n 1
(cited in note 10).
19 23 Wash App 454, 597 P2d 424 (1979), aff'd, 96 Wash 2d 794, 613 P2d 776 (1979). In
some jurisdictions, the insanity defense is formulated broadly enough to cover such a case.
Model Penal Code § 4.01, for example, uses the phrase "mental disease or defect" (emphasis
added). On the other hand, while mentally retarded actors may be excused under this for-
mulation, it is not clear that a defense would be available to the actor who is immature
simply because of an isolated childhood or other socialization disorders.
80 61 Md App 35, 484 A2d 1020 (1984). The court in Parker rejected the defendant's
claim, holding that the defense should be applied according to the defendant's birthday but
not his birthhour. Of course, this hardly alters the arbitrariness of the defense or the irra-
tionality of its results. Under the court's rule, Parker would have had the defense if he had
committed the violation nine hours and forty-six minutes earlier or if he had been born
eleven hours and eleven minutes later.
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presumptions contained in current formulations. That is, an actor
below a given age might be presumed immature unless the prose-
cution proved otherwise, and an actor above a given age might be
presumed mature unless the defense proved otherwise. There is
some precedent for such a rebuttable presumption approach in
state codes and at common law."'
Like the misguided use of objective criteria, another common
flaw in principles of adjudication is the failure to individualize an
objective standard. The rejection of an individualized standard is
appropriate for rules of conduct, but such individualization is de-
sirable for principles of adjudication. For example, some individu-
alization of the negligence standard is important to a proper as-
sessment of an actor's blameworthiness. It is simply not true that
we expect the same thing from all persons in a given situation. It
may be culpable negligence for an ordinary person to block an
emergency vehicle at a critical moment; the same behavior may not
be culpable for a blind person. It may be culpable negligence for an
ordinary person to permit a child to swim in the ocean after a big
meal; but it may not be culpable negligence for a twelve year-old
babysitter. The father who leaves the stove on while taking his
just-burned child to the hospital and the driver who loses control
of his car when a passenger tells him of his son's unexpected death
also illustrate the need to individualize the reasonable person stan-
dard, if it is to accurately reflect the normative expectations by
which the community assigns or withholds blame.
The failure to individualize the reasonable person standard in
the definition of negligence infects many other doctrines of adjudi-
cation, including those that allow a defense for a "reasonable" mis-
take or belief. A "reasonable" belief (and by analogy any other
term modified by the word "reasonable") is defined as a non-negli-
gent belief."2 Thus, a "reasonableness" standard incorporates the
flaws of the negligence definition. The failure to properly individu-
alize the negligence definition, then, will overstate our normative
81 In several states, the fact that the defendant is younger than a specified age creates
only a rebuttable presumption of immaturity. See Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-501 (West 1978)
(under 14); Cal Penal Code § 26(1) (West Cune Supp 1988) (under 14); Nev Rev Stat chs
194.010(1)-(2), 193.210 (1977) (between ages of 8 and 14); 21 Okla Stat Ann § 152(1)-(2)
(West 1983) (between 7 and 14); SD Cod Laws Ann § 22-3-1(1)-(2) (Cum Supp 1987) (be-
tween 10 and 14); Wash Rev Code Ann § 9A.04.050 (West 1977) (between 8 and 12). This
also was the approach of the common law. Children under seven were given a defense; chil-
dren over seven but under twelve (or fourteen) were entitled to a presumption of immatu-
rity, but the presumption could be rebutted. See William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on
the Laws of England 452-53 (U Chicago, 1979).
s See MPC § 1.13(16).
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expectations of an actor in applying the defenses of reasonable
mistake of law, reasonable mistake as to a justification, or reasona-
ble resistance to duress. 8 3
These improper formulations of principles of adjudication
have a second order effect that in some instances may be even
more harmful than their primary failing. Because the culpability
doctrines of negligence and recklessness are unreliable in assigning
culpability, current law understandably tends to avoid assigning li-
ability for negligent and reckless behavior or for risk-creation of-
fenses, which tend to rely upon the definitions of negligence and
recklessness. 4 But this leaves unprohibited and unpunished con-
duct that few would dispute ought to be prohibited and
punished."
"Admittedly, criminal law theorists have not yet been able to fashion a workable prin-
ciple that distinguishes those characteristics of the actor that should be taken into account
from those characteristics that should not. But the treatment to be accorded certain charac-
teristics is relatively clear. As the Model Penal Code commentary notes with regard to de-
termining negligence:
If the actor were blind or if he had just suffered a blow or experienced a heart attack,
these would certainly be facts to be considered in a judgment involving criminal liabil-
ity, as they would under traditional law. But the heredity.., or temperament of the
actor would not be held material in judging negligence .... The [Code's use of the
phrase "in the actor's situation"] is not intended to displace discriminations of this
kind, but rather to leave the issue to the courts.
MPC § 2.02(4), comment 242 (footnotes omitted). The literature provides further examples
of characteristics that should be considered under a reasonable person standard. See, for
example, George P. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis,
119 U Pa L Rev 401, 429 (1971) (duress, insanity, or other conditions rendering conduct
involuntary and thus blameless); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 109 (Little,
Brown, 1945) (blindness, infancy, and insanity); and Glanville L. Williams, Criminal Law:
The General Part § 36 at 101-02 (Stevens & Sons, 2d ed 1961) (admitting the possibility of
a system that would consider education, opportunities, and means of knowledge; noting that
courts have considered age, sudden blows to the head, sudden manifestations of neurosis,
and unforeseeable consequences of intoxicants).
Writers also have identified characteristics that should not be considered in individual-
izing the reasonable person standard. See, for example, Fletcher, 119 U Pa L Rev at 433
("temperament, intellect, and education"); Williams, Criminal Law § 36 at 101 (noting the
impropriety of considering capacity for imagination and foresight; noting that in general
courts have not embarked on a course of including and excluding certain personal character-
istics). There seems little doubt that such characteristics as maliciousness, meanness, decep-
tiveness, destructiveness, or dishonesty do not alter our normative expectations and should
not be taken into account.
8 For a discussion of other such distortions and counter-distortions of the doctrine, see
note 87.
85 One would think, for example, that there would be little dispute that persons should
not create a risk of explosion that would destroy a warehouse or create a risk of fire that
would destroy a residence; yet current doctrine commonly does not prohibit the creation of
such risks. See, for example, Commonwealth v Simkins, 297 Pa Super 258, 443 A2d 825
(1982) (the storing of a drum of acetone sealed only with paper towels, which created risk of
fire to the residence in which it was stored, was insufficient to establish the risk required for
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IV. PROPOSALS
Two sorts of difficulties with current doctrine have been
noted. First, because of formulations and codifications that are in-
sensitive to a doctrine's function-of either defining and communi-
cating clear and usable rules of conduct or articulating principles
that accurately adjudicate an actor's blameworthiness-much of
current doctrine fails to effectively perform its function. A second
difficulty arises from the failure of current doctrine to distinguish
rules of conduct acquittals from principles of adjudication acquit-
tals, a failure that undercuts the prohibitions of the rules of con-
duct."' The starting point for solving both problems is to draft laws
that recognize and reflect the distinction between rules of conduct
and principles of adjudication.
The first and most important reform proposal, then, is the for-
mulation and drafting of independent codes or parts of a code for
rules of conduct and principles of adjudication to reflect their two
distinct functions. The rules of conduct should be stated in simple,
brief, and commonly understood language that can be widely dis-
seminated. The principles of adjudication should be made as com-
conviction for risking catastrophe under 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3302(b) (Purdon 1983)). See
also NJ Stat Ann § 2C:17-2(c),(e) (West 1982) (requiring risk of damage to ten or more
habitations or to a building that normally would contain fifty or more persons at the time of
the offense).
" To prevent such undercutting, many substantive provisions are altered to minimize
the acquittal of violators, but such distortions create their own set of injustices. For exam-
ple, Judge Leventhal argues against giving a defense for even a reasonable mistake as to a
justification as follows:
We should refuse to cut away and weaken the core standards for behavior provided by
the criminal law. Softening the standards of conduct rather than ameliorating their
application serves only to undermine the behavioral incentives the law was enacted to
provide.
United States v Barker, 546 F2d 940, 972 (DC Cir 1976) (Leventhal dissenting) (footnote
omitted). Lord Coleridge's opinion in Dudley and Stephens makes a similar point. The de-
fendants were denied both a lesser evils justification and a mistaken justification excuse for
their killing of a dying cabin boy in order to consume his blood and thereby live long enough
to be rescued from their drifting lifeboat.
It is not needful to point out the awful danger of admitting the principle which has
been contended for [of allowing a defense for Dudley and Stephens' killing of the cabin
boy].... [I]t is quite plain that such a principle once admitted might be made the legal
cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime.
The Queen v Dudley and Stephens, 14 QBD 273, 287-88 (1884). See also Russell v State,
219 Ala 567, 122 S 683, 685 (1929), quoting Street v Sinclair, 71 Ala 110, 115 (1881) (in
discussing the prohibition against the use of violence to repossess property the court notes:
"'But he proceeds at his own peril if he commits the slightest assault, or other breach of the
public peace, for, if individuals were thus allowed to redress their own private injuries, the
peace of society and good order of government would cease' "). For further illustrations of
such compensating distortions, see note 87.
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plex or discretionary as is necessary to properly capture the com-
munity's evaluation of blameworthiness, without the constraints
that might be imposed on a document designed for unsupervised,
lay application.
The drafting of an independent "Code of Conduct" and "Code
of Justice" also would allow the rules of conduct to be kept invari-
ant without depriving actors of merited excuses. If an excuse is ap-
propriate, it can be made available through a separate doctrine ad-
judicating blame. Independent codes also would permit the
doctrines of adjudication to be more individualized without fear
that such individualization would undercut the rules of conduct.
An acquittal based upon no violation of the rules of conduct would
announce approval of the conduct and reaffirm the rule and its
scope. An acquittal based upon an absence of blame would an-
nounce disapproval of the conduct and similarly reaffirm the rule
and its scope.87
A second kind of reform made possible by distinguishing and
segregating the two functions lies in formulating procedures for ar-
rest, charging, trial, and disposition. For example, the arrest and
charging process might employ the distinction by using probable
cause for a violation of a doctrine of criminalization as the stan-
dard for arrest, leaving justification and principles of adjudication
issues for post-arrest adjudication.
The most important procedural reform might be the introduc-
tion of a different verdict for no-violation acquittals than for no-
blame acquittals. Such verdicts-"no violation" and "blameless vi-
olation"-would clearly indicate whether this actor's conduct is ap-
proved or disapproved, so that the public could properly guide its
future conduct. Such a verdict system is simply an expansion of
the distinction currently recognized by the "not guilty by reason of
87 One additional benefit that might be derived from distinguishing no-violation acquit-
tals from no-blame acquittals is that legislators (and courts) would no longer be inclined to
distort doctrine in order to avoid acquitting violators and, in turn, to adopt liberalizing
counter-distortions. For example, if non-negligent violations could be exempt from liability
without undercutting the rules of conduct, by distinguishing such no-blame acquittals from
no-violation acquittals, then it might be feasible to provide a broader, more individualized
definition of negligence that more properly mirrors our culpability notions. If a more accu-
rate and reliable definition of negligence were adopted, it might be possible, in turn, to
criminalize more instances of risk-creation and to more frequently assess culpability for neg-
ligent violations. And with these reforms in place, it might in turn be more possible to abol-
ish the use of strict liability. The same need for chains of reform exists in the troublesome
areas of omission liability, justification defenses, and excuse defenses.
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insanity" verdict. The verdict admits a violation of the rule of con-
duct but judges the actor blameless for it.88
One also might wish to rely on the rules of conduct/principles
of adjudication distinction in allocating the burdens of proof at
trial. Given the primarily objective criteria of the rules of conduct,
it is reasonable to expect the state to prove a violation. The doc-
trines of adjudication, however, given their focus on the individual
characteristics or the state of mind of the defendant, are more eas-
ily proven by the defendant.89 One might reach the same conclu-
sion by arguing that because the rules of conduct are designed pri-
marily to guide the conduct of future actors, their application is a
function more properly shouldered by the state than by the de-
fendant. Because the principles of adjudication concern the blame-
worthiness of a particular defendant, who admittedly has violated
the rules of conduct, disproving blameworthiness might properly
be the burden of the defendant rather than the state.
On the other hand, the conceptualization proposed here might
suggest that the doctrines of criminalization and culpability ought
to be distinguished from the doctrines of justification and excuse
in allocating the burden of proof. The former doctrines are neces-
sary to create at least a rebuttable presumption of the two mini-
mum requirements necessary for criminal liability-violation of
the rules of conduct and blameworthiness for so doing. The latter
" I have made a similar proposal for a special verdict in Robinson, 82 Colum L Rev at
290 (cited in note 23). Greenawalt argues that a general verdict is useful to preserve the
jury's right to disagree with the law and to follow its own intuitive judgments of justice.
Greenawalt, 84 Colum L Rev at 1900-01 (cited in note 22). Whether or not one agrees with
this function of general verdicts, the argument does not undercut my proposal. Providing
two acquittal verdicts-acquittal based upon no violation of the rules of conduct and acquit-
tel based upon no blame for a violation-restricts very little the jury's ability to act upon its
intuitive judgment. The concepts of and the distinction between rules of conduct and prin-
ciples of adjudication are as intuitively recognized and understood as the distinction be-
tween harm and blame. Such verdicts, however, would require a jury to determine whether
the group shared the same judgment on this basic distinction-no violation versus blameless
violation-but this would seem a valuable effect.
Note that the objections to the two-verdict system proposed here apply equally to the
"not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict; yet that verdict seems workable in practice. It
does not appear to unacceptably restrict the jury's right to follow its own intuitive judg-
ments of justice.
89 This corresponds with the general evidentiary rule that the party in the best position
to prove an issue-i.e., with best access to the information-should have the burden of prov-
ing it. See, for example, LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law § 1.8(c) at 52 (cited in note 36);
Edward W. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 337 at 950 (West, 3d ed 1984) (discussing
but criticizing this rationale for allocation); and State v Savoie, 67 NJ 439, 341 A2d 598, 611
n 8 (1975) (invoking this rationale in allocating to defendant the burden of production on
issue of mistake).
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serve to rebut the presumptions and, typically, arise in fewer and
in unusual cases. Therefore, the burden of proving the former doc-
trines and establishing a rebuttable presumption of liability might
properly be allocated to the state; the burden of proving the latter
doctrines and rebutting the presumption might be allocated to the
defendant.90
While there are at least two alternative theories for rational
allocation of the burdens of proof, the rules of conduct/principles
of adjudication distinction is not useful in choosing between the
two theories. The difficulty stems not from the conceptualization
but rather from the failure of evidence theory to settle on the ap-
propriate criterion for allocating burdens of proof.9 '
Shifting some of the current burdens of proof may be impor-
tant to overcoming legislative resistance to the full range of doc-
trines of blame. Reforms that seek to broaden exculpation of the
blameless-for example, the shift from strict liability offenses to
negligence, the greater individualization of the reasonable person
standard in negligence, and the recognition of an excuse for a rea-
sonable mistake of law-may be politically unacceptable without
allocating to the defendant one or more of the burdens of proof on
such issues. From a defendant's perspective, the advantages from a
broadening of the doctrines of blame frequently would outweigh
the disadvantages of being required to shoulder the burden of
proof. Requiring the defendant to prove non-negligence, for exam-
ple, would be an improvement, from the defendant's perspective,
over strict liability's irrebuttable presumption of negligence.
The rules of conduct/principles of adjudication distinction also
might be useful after trial, at the disposition stage. For example, it
may be advisable to attach non-punishment conditions upon or
maintain civil jurisdiction over a defendant acquitted under a doc-
trine of blame adjudication where there is a continuing danger he
90 This corresponds with the general evidentiary rule, which has a certain commonsense
appeal, that the party benefiting from an issue should have the burden of raising and mak-
ing some minimal showing on it. See McCormick on Evidence § 337 at 952 (cited in note 89)
(civil rules); see also MPC § 1.12(4) (employing this rule where issues other than an "ele-
ment of an offense" are at issue).
91 Compare Ronald J. Allen, Mullaney v Wilbur, The Supreme Court, and the Sub-
stantive Criminal Law-An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 Tex
L Rev 269 (1977); and John C. Jeifries, Jr., and Paul B. Stephan I, Defenses, Presump-
tions and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L J 1325 (1979). Of course, one
might want to use different theories in allocating different burdens of proof-the burden of
going forward, the burden of production, and the burden of persuasion.
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will violate the rules of conduct.92 Where the acquittal is based
upon a finding of no violation of the rules of conduct, there is by
definition no reason to avoid repetition of the conduct in the fu-
ture and therefore no reason for continuing criminal or civil
jurisdiction.
Still another reform this conceptualization might facilitate
would be to vary the level of adherence to the legality principle.
Under the legality principle, criminal liability and punishment can
be based only upon a prior, written offense that is expressed with
adequate precision and clarity. 3 One is inclined to demand the
greatest precision in the primary prohibitions of the doctrines of
criminalization, for these contain specific rules of conduct. One
might demand slightly less precision in a secondary prohibition.
Secondary prohibitions also must communicate a clear rule, but
much of the required notice is already communicated by a clear
primary prohibition. That is, one can give sufficient notice by ad-
vising actors that they must not only avoid the conduct described
by the primary prohibitions but also must avoid aiding it, attempt-
ing it, and agreeing with or soliciting others to attempt it.
One might tolerate still less precision in the doctrines of justi-
fication, which contain the permissive portion of the rules of con-
duct; an actor is not required to perform this conduct but rather is
authorized to if she chooses. Indeed, reduced standards of preci-
sion may be necessary for justifications. The situationally-depend-
ent nature of these doctrines means that, to remain communicable
rules of conduct, justifications cannot be stated with great
specificity.
The nature of the doctrines adjudicating blame suggests a still
lower level of precision. The doctrines of culpability and excuse
play no part in stating the rules of conduct; an actor is not to guide
her conduct by the formulation of these doctrines. In fact, many
excuse defenses presume an actor's incapacity to guide her conduct
in accordance with the announced rules. Further, the individual-
ized nature of the doctrines of excuse suggest that they can only be
described in broader, more general terms. More specific, fixed cri-
teria would not adequately take account of the full range of indi-
vidual characteristics that might be relevant to blameworthiness.
" The most obvious example is the dangerous mentally ill offender. There may be
other instances, however, where a non-punishment condition or restriction is appropriate.
See Robinson, 82 Colum L Rev at 285-90 (cited in note 23).
" See Robinson, 25 Harv J Leg at 393-94 (cited in note 67).
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Different rationales support application of the legality princi-
ple to doctrines of adjudication than to the rules of conduct. No-
tice is the primary rationale for rules of conduct. Without notice of
what conduct is prohibited, required, and permitted, there is no
basis on which to condemn an actor for a violation and little hope
that the criminal law can gain future compliance. For principles of
adjudication, the rationales are different. Wide dissemination of
the principles of adjudication is not necessary either to condemn
violation of or to gain compliance with the rules of conduct. In-
stead of notice, the legality rationales include: increasing uniform-
ity of application to similar cases, limiting the potential for abuse
of discretion, and minimizing the improper delegation of criminal-
ization authority from the legislature to the courts. These ration-
ales are furthered by the codification of principles of adjudication.
To demand great precision in the written principles is to compel a
false precision that will distort the assessment of blameworthiness.
One final use of the rules of conduct/principles of adjudication
distinction might lie in taking account of the frequently conflicting
demands of utilitarian and just desert goals in determining the dis-
tribution of criminal liability and punishment. The utilitarian goal
is the elimination or at least the reduction of future crime; the just
desert goal is the imposition on an offender of that degree of pun-
ishment deserved for a past crime. For example, one might rely
primarily on desert concerns in formulating the principles of adju-
dication,94 for the issue of blameworthiness is the primary concern
of the adjudication principles.9e The rules of conduct, in contrast,
might be formulated to give greater deference to utilitarian con-
cerns. At the very least, the rules of conduct/principles of adjudica-
tion distinction may in some way, perhaps in conjunction with
other distinctions, provide a greater opportunity to devise a princi-
pled distribution of criminal liability; this would be a great im-
provement over the nebulous and potentially deceptive "balanc-
ing" or "mixing" of utilitarian and desert purposes that is
currently fashionable.96
" Some writers argue that utilitarian concerns support the distribution of liability ac-
cording to desert. See Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilita-
rian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 Yale L J 315 (1984).
'" Desert theorists might well have much to say about what should and should not be
criminalized. My claim here is simply that having control of the principles of adjudication
would be more important to furthering desert concerns.
" See Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions,
82 Nw U L Rev 19, 19-22 (1987).
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Ultimately, criminal law doctrine that distinguishes rules of
conduct from principles of adjudication can more accurately and
fully differentiate conduct that society believes ought to be an-
nounced as criminal from conduct that it believes ought not, and
between actors whom society feels ought to be condemned for a
violation of the rules from those whom it would not condemn.

